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Background: Decisions made on behalf of other people are sometimes more rational than those made for oneself.
In this study we used a monetary gambling task to ask if the framing effect in decision-making is reduced in surrogate
decision-making.
Methods: Participants made a series of choices between a predetermined sure option and a risky gambling option of
winning a proportion of an initial stake. Trials were presented as either a gain or a loss relative to that initial stake. In
half of the trials participants made choices to earn money for themselves and in the other half they earned money for
another participant. Framing effects were measured as risk seeking in loss frames and risk aversion in gain frames.
Results: Significant framing effects were observed both in trials in which participants earned money for themselves
and those in which they earned money for another person; however, these framing effects were significantly
reduced when making decisions for another person. It appears that the reduced emotional involvement when
the decision-maker is not affected by the outcome of the decision thus lessens the framing effect without eradicating
it altogether.
Conclusions: This suggests that the deviation from rational choices in decision-making can be significantly reduced
when the emotional impact on the decision maker is lessened. These results are discussed in relation to Somatic
Distortion Theory.Background
Recent research suggests that framing effects may be the
result of distortions in probability estimation that result
from the interplay between emotional processing and
decision-making (De Martino et al. 2006; Tunney &
Ziegler, submitted). Framing effects occur when the de-
cisions that people make change as a result of the way in
which the outcomes are described to the participant.
Typically, framing effects are revealed as aversions to
risk when gambles are presented as gains, and prefer-
ences for risk when presented as losses. The classic ex-
ample is the ‘Disease Problem’ (Tversky and Kahneman
1981) in which the participants were presented with a vi-
gnette describing the choices available to a government
in preparing for a disease pandemic. In the gain frame
the choice is between a ‘sure’ option of saving some, but* Correspondence: richard.tunney@nottingham.ac.uk
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unless otherwise stated.not all lives, and a ‘risky’ option with a chance that
everyone will be saved but a chance also that everyone
will die. The expected utilities in both frames are identi-
cal but described slightly differently. In the loss frame
the outcomes are worded differently; in the ‘sure’ option,
some but not all lives will be lost; and in the risky option
there is a chance that all lives will be lost, and a chance
that none will be lost. The basic result is that partici-
pants tend to prefer the sure option of definitely saving
some people in the gain frame. However, when pre-
sented with the loss frame, participants tend to prefer
the risky choice. In this design a framing effect is re-
vealed as a kind of preference reversal. This variance in
decision-making for essentially the same problem is a
clear and robust violation of rational choice theory (see
Mellers et al. 1998). On reflection it should come as no
surprise that emotion would play some part in decisions
about vignettes that involve the hypothetical death of
thousands of people, or more trivially about real finan-
cial rewards. Almost inevitably the choices that we make
in these sorts of scenarios are likely to be affected by ourCentral. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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projection of how we would feel given the outcome), in
addition to the analytic computation of the problem.
This may be the result of an affect heuristic (Slovic et al.
2002) or a distortion in the estimate of subjective prob-
ability (Tunney & Ziegler submitted). It follows that if
we are not emotionally involved in the outcomes of a
decision then these framing effects should be reduced or
disappear entirely. In this paper we report an experiment
in which participants made a series of choices between a
sure outcome and a gamble in both gain and loss frames.
Our key manipulation was that on half the trials the par-
ticipant was the financial beneficiary of the outcome of
the decisions, while on the other half the beneficiary was
another person.
Until recently research has almost exclusively focused
on decisions people make for themselves. Whilst these
are likely to form the majority of decisions that we
make, there are nonetheless a sizeable number of deci-
sions we make for someone else in our personal, social
and professional lives. Would we expect to see a differ-
ence between decisions we make for ourselves compared
to those we make for others? According to the risk-as-
feeling hypothesis (Loewenstein et al. 2001) risk is proc-
essed as a feeling of anticipation or fear, rather than an
objective numerical value. Experiencing this visceral or
somatic responses to risk puts the decision-maker into a
hot state of cognition, but because of interpersonal em-
pathy gaps the emotional response of another person to
risk is underestimated (Loewenstein 1996). As a conse-
quence, it can be predicted that decision-makers would
make decisions less influenced by the emotional re-
sponse to risk for other people, in other words, decisions
for self and others under risk would be different.
However, results from several studies investigating the
difference between self and other risky decisions are far
from clear-cut. Although differences is self-other deci-
sion making have been observed in non-financial risky
decisions (Stone and Allgaier 2008; Stone et al. 2013).
Stone et al. (2002) summarized the literature as generally
not showing a difference in decisions involving monetary
payoffs under risk which are made for self and other.
This is perhaps counterintuitive, as the risk-as-feeling
hypothesis would predict that with the reduced emo-
tional impact of a decision where the outcome does not
affect the decision maker, he or she becomes more risk
seeking. And indeed that is the result from Hsee and
Weber’s (1997) landmark study on the framing effect in
self and other decisions. When predicting the decisions
another person would make, participants were more risk
seeking than in decisions made for themselves (Hsee
and Weber 1997). However, Hadar and Fischer (2008)
found the opposite pattern: participants were more risk
seeking in decisions made for themselves than predictionsfor others, especially when risks were high and the deci-
sions were reciprocal. And, in a third pattern, Benjamin
and Robbins (2007) found no difference in risk seeking be-
haviour in self and other decisions in a task which in-
volved hypothetical payoffs.
Why might we see such differences in decisions made
for another person? Ziegler and Tunney (2012) predicted
that the relative social or emotional distance to other
person plays a pivotal role. They asked participants to
make a series of decisions, choosing between a smaller
immediate reward and a larger delayed reward. When
the decision was made for themselves participants were
more impulsive than if the decision was made for more
socially distant people. Ziegler and Tunney modeled so-
cial distance based on Wright’s (1922) coefficient of related-
ness and found that impulsivity declined systematically
with the distance of the relationship and was lowest for a
complete stranger, but very high for a best friend. The re-
duced impact of receiving an immediate reward appeared
to improve participants’ ability of self-control, leading to
decisions that were closer to a normative choice optimum.
Tunney and Ziegler (submitted) used this result in
conjunction with a careful analysis of the surrogate
decision-making literature to formulate the Somatic
Distortion theory of surrogate decision-making, which
attempts to capture the potential conflicts between the
different perspectives one might encounter when mak-
ing a decision on behalf of another person, along with
the familiarity between decision-maker and recipient,
and the individual differences in the factors that might
affect perspective taking. In doing so the model pre-
dicts when a decision made for another person is differ-
ent from a decision made for ourselves. The model
assumes that when making a decision on behalf of an-
other person, the decision maker compares the preferred
outcome from a number of different perspectives. The de-
cision maker considers what they would do if they were
the beneficiary of the decision, they simulate what they be-
lieve the beneficiary would choose, and what they believe
what the best outcome for the beneficiary would be irre-
spective of their own wishes or the beneficiaries. We refer
to each perspective as Projected, Simulated, and Benevo-
lent respectively. Of course, the decision-maker might
simply decide what they would prefer to outcome to be ir-
respective of either the beneficiaries wishes, or indeed
what they would chose if they were the beneficiary. In this
egocentric scenario the decision maker does not attempt
to make a surrogate decision and the theory does not
apply. In computing a decision from each perspective the
decision maker makes an estimated utility judgment. The
subjective utility estimation is distorted as a function of
the participants’ knowledge or familiarity with the benefi-
ciary. Given that what we would choose might be different
from what we think another person might choose, and
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we believe the best choice (the benevolent choice) to be,
the model includes a simple majority choice rule to decide
what the actual surrogate decision would be. Of course,
perspective taking is an individual difference and we ex-
pect that the accuracy of a surrogate utility judgment will
vary not only as a function of external factors such as fa-
miliarity, but also of internal factors such as ones ability to
take another person’s perspective.
Instances in the literature when participants were predict-
ing what another person should (e.g. Ziegler and Tunney
2012) or would (e.g. Hsee and Weber 1997) do is not the
same as making actual decisions on behalf of another per-
son. This study seeks to investigate, firstly, how people
actually make decisions for someone else when those deci-
sions influence the other person’s pay-offs and, secondly,
how the decisions made for someone else compare to the
choices made when completing the same task for oneself.
Both the risk-as-feeling hypothesis (Loewenstein et al.
2001) and the Somatic Distortion Theory (Tunney &
Ziegler, submitted) predict that people will be more risk
seeking when making decisions for others than for self,
because the emotional impact of the risky choices is re-
duced when the outcome affects a distant other.
Methods
Participants
Seventy-three participants [19 males (mean age 23.2 years ±
8.3) 54 females (mean age 20.1 years ± 1.0)] took part in
return for a financial reward dependent on the choices
made during the experiment. All participants were
studying for a university degree at the University of
Nottingham (N = 37) or the University of Lincoln (N = 36).
The study was conducted with the approval of both
Schools’ Ethics Committees.
Experimental paradigm
Participants were presented with a variation of the finan-
cial decision-making task created by De Martino et al.
(2006). Participants were tested individually. They were
told in one part of the experiment that they would re-
ceive the payoffs of their decisions and in the other part
that the payoffs would go to another anonymous partici-
pant. Participants were not informed of the second part
until they had completed the first and the order of parts
was counterbalanced. On each trial, participants were
first told the amount of money at stake (e.g. £150). They
were then presented with a sure option (framed as a gain
or loss of a fraction of the money at stake, e.g. you keep
(s/he keeps) £100 or you lose (s/he loses) £50), and a
gamble option (with a pie chart representing the odds of
winning vs. losing all the money at stake).
The choices between the sure and gamble options in
experimental trials were between a 20, 40, 60 or 80percent chance of keeping all the money with the sure
offer matched to obtain the same percentage of the ini-
tial offer, so that the sure offer and gamble offer were
equal in expected value. Eight filler trials in which the
gamble option and eight in which the sure option had
the greater expected value were interspersed to maintain
participants’ motivation to make choices. A further eight
control trials with probabilities to keep all the money of
five and 95 percent respectively acted as catch control
trials. In one block participants made decisions for self
and in the other block they made decisions for another,
with a practice session prior to the first block. Blocks
were counterbalanced and participants were given no in-
formation about the second block of the experiment until
the first was completed. Participants completed eight
blocks of trials in the self and other conditions, each block
consisting of four experimental, two filler and one catch
trial. Each block was followed by interim feedback, indi-
cating a running total of the amount of money won so far.
To ensure that risk seeking would occur (Harinck et al.
2007), Participants played with larger virtual money offers
of £150, £300, £450 and £600 that were converted into
cash payments at the end of the experiment by dividing
the grand total by 4000. At the end of the session partici-
pants were paid the money they had won in the self-
condition, and money they had won in the other condition
was placed into an envelope to be handed to the next but
one participant. Participants received an envelope from
the previous but one participant to make up their total
pay. The first two participants therefore had to wait until
the last and second to last participant had completed the
experiment as their envelopes came from them.
Results
Participants’ choices for self and other were converted to
percentages of experimental trials in which they chose
the gamble options in the loss or gain frames. Figure 1
shows the percentages of risky choices made for self and
other in both loss and gain frames. The experimental tri-
als had identical payoffs for sure and gamble options
and therefore the effect of framing on decisions can be
calculated from the percentage of trials in which partici-
pants chose the “gamble” option in the gain frame com-
pared to the loss frame. In the gain frame the participants
made more gambles for others than they did for them-
selves (other M = 39.93, sd = 16.18; self M= 36.48, sd =
16.19), and fewer gambles for others in the loss frame
compared to gambles made for themselves (other M =
57.91, sd = 17.75; self M= 60.91, sd = 17.93). These data
were entered into a repeated-measures ANOVA with the
within-subjects factors of Target of the decision with 2
levels (self, other) and Frame of the choice with 2 levels
(gain, loss). As a control the order of the conditions was
entered as a between-subject factor.
Figure 1 The Decision-Making task. Participants were first told the amount of money at stake (e.g. £150) and were told that they could never
keep all of the initial stake. They were then presented with a sure option (framed as a gain or loss of a fraction of the money at stake, e.g. keep
£100 or lose £50), and a gamble option (with a pie chart representing the odds of winning vs. losing all the money at stake). In the experimental
trials the utilities of the sure option and gamble option were equal. Participants completed the task once for themselves (panel A) and once for
an unknown other participant (panel B) with the wording of the framing reflecting this change in perspective.
Figure 2 Percent of risky choices by Target and by Frame. Error
bars are +1 standard error of the mean.
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64.94, MSE = 506.22, p < .01, η2p = .48), but no main ef-
fect of Target of the decision (F1, 71 < 1.0), or of the
Order of conditions (F1, 71 < 1.0). There was, however, an
interaction between Target and Frame (F1, 71 = 8.62,
MSE = 87.27, p < .01, η2p = .11). There was no main effect
of Order or any interactions with Order of presentation
(all Fs < 1.0, except Target X Order: F1, 71 = 1.43, MSE =
105.22, p = .24, η2p = .02). Paired sample t-tests reveal that
the interaction is driven by a significant increase of gam-
bling in the gain frame when making decisions for
others compared to self (t72 = 2.01, se = 1.71, p = .04,
Cohen’s d = .24), while the decrease in the gambles in
the loss frame between self and other approaches signifi-
cance (t72 = −1.96, se = 1.53, p = .05, Cohen’s d = .23).
The susceptibility to the framing effect is best
expressed as the difference of gambling choices made in
the gain and loss frames; an increase in gambling choices
in the loss frame signals risk seeking which is fundamen-
tal to the framing effect (Tversky and Kahneman 1981,
1986). The mean difference in risky choices made in
the loss and gain frames for each target are shown in
Figure 2. The increase in risky choices for losses relative
to gains for self and other is shown in Figure 3. Al-
though participants’ choices are subject to the framing
effect in both conditions, there is a significant reduction
of the effect when gambles are made for another person
(t72, 2.95, se = 2.19, p < .01, Cohen’s d = .35), indicating
that risk seeking, whilst present, is significantly reduced.Discussion
The experiment reported here investigated whether
earning money for someone else affects risk seeking in a
framed monetary gambling task. We presented partici-
pants with choices between sure and risky options in a
series of gambles allowing them to win money; in one
condition earning money for themselves and in the other
Figure 3 Increase in risky choices for losses relative to gains by
Target. Error bars are +/− 1 standard error of the mean.
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contrast to Stone et al.’s (Stone et al. 2002) assertion that
there are no differences in self and other decisions in
monetary risk decisions we found that whilst framing
occurred in both types of decision, there was a clear re-
duction in the framing effect when the decisions were
not made for self.
How do our results speak to the questions of whether
we are more risk seeking when making decisions on be-
half of others? We found that participants were more
risk seeking in making decisions for others compared to
self but only in the gain frame. That is, when the options
are framed as a gain then the predetermined outcome is
preferred in self decisions compared to decisions made
for others. In this sense, people are more risk seeking
when making decisions for others. In the loss frame,
however, they were less risk seeking when making deci-
sions for others than they were for themselves. That is,
risk seeking, whilst present, is significantly reduced when
making decisions for someone else. Although, we have
considered financial decisions in the laboratory a num-
ber of reports have documented similar effects for non-
financial decisions involving risky behaviors or outcomes
(Stone et al. 2013). Some of these (e.g. Wang 1996) that
involve risk of death are similar to the original Disease
Problem (Tversky and Kahneman 1981) and demon-
strate the importance studying the more social aspects
of decision-making such as this research to other fields
such as medical decision making and aging research. Ex-
planations for these social influences on decision making
have included strategic game theoretical models (e.g.Trautmann and Vieider 2011; Tetlock 2002) or in terms
emotional influences (Faro and Rottenstreich 2006, Tun-
ney & Ziegler, submitted). There is some suggestion that
the anonymity of the decision-maker relative to the re-
cipient is also relevant with a degree of accountability or
familiarity between the two people affecting the degree
of bias (Pahlke et al. 2012; Hsee and Weber 1997; Ziegler
and Tunney 2012). A number of other studies have found
similar reductions in other cognitive biases when the deci-
sions are made on behalf of other people (e.g. Fernandez-
Duque and Wifall 2007; Garcia-Retamero and Galesic
2012; Jonas and Frey 2003; Nicolle et al. 2012; Ziegler and
Tunney 2012).
There are other possible explanations for the observed
reduction in framing effects for surrogate decision-making
in the current study, which need to be addressed. One of
the assumptions of Prospect Theory (Kahneman and
Tversky 1979) is reference dependence, in that individuals
identify a reference point representing their current state
(Epley et al. 2004; Epley and Gilovich 2006). Gains and
losses are therefore considered relative to this point. In
surrogate decision-making, the current state of others is
not known, so this potentially has to be approximated,
possibly the reason for the decrease in framing effects
when making decisions for others. Furthermore, other fac-
tors could also contribute to or be responsible for the re-
duction in framing effects for surrogate decisions. For
example, Anderson’s (2003) Rational-emotional model, as-
sumes that decision-making is influenced by factors that
seek to reduce negative emotions, such as fear and anx-
iety. This is relevant to (De Martino et al. 2006) findings
that show a role of the amygdala in decision-making and
could explain what is meant by changes in ‘emotional in-
volvement’. Furthermore the results of the current study
could also be accounted for by a Social functionalist ap-
proach (Tetlock 2002) whereby the accountability and jus-
tification of the decision influences which decision is
taken. If participants in the current study felt that they
may possibly have to justify or be held accountable for
their surrogate decisions, then this may also account for
the reduction in framing effects. Further to this, studies
such as (Wang 1996) have shown that the pattern of
decision-making is influenced by social and moral factors,
including the number of surrogates and the decision
maker’s relationship to the surrogates. This relates to the
social distance, as mentioned in the Background section,
but this was discussed in light of delayed gratification and
impulsivity.
Conclusions
The data reported here complement a growing body of
research that suggests that many traditional violations of
rational choice theory can be reduced or eliminated
when the decision environment is presented in format
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a number of studies have shown that presenting gambles
in frequency form can reduce base-rate neglect (e.g.
Harries and Harvey 2000) and preference reversals (e.g.
Tunney 2006). We believe that the bias that is reduced
in the study reported here is one that is caused by a dis-
tortion in subjective utility estimation by an expectation
of the emotional consequences of the decision. The sub-
jective utility function in Prospect Theory itself gives an
emotional account of the relative increase in risk seeking
for losses relative to gains almost by definition of being
subjective (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). It follows that
by removing the personal relevance of the judgment one
removes something of this emotional or somatic distor-
tion and decisions become more normative and object-
ive when they are made on behalf of other people.
The pattern of responses sits nicely within the Somatic
Distortion framework. The emotional impact of the risk
decisions is reduced when the outcome does not affect
the decision maker directly. In the gain frame this means
being less drawn to the certainty of the sure option and
in the loss frame this causes a reduction in loss aversion
and thus less risky gambling choices are made. We be-
lieve that this is the first report that the relative increase
in risk seeking behaviour for loss frames is reduced when
the decisions are made on behalf of other people, relative
to when people make the same decisions for themselves.
This is consistent with a general optimism about the sub-
jective nature of cognitive biases, and a growing interest
in the role that emotion plays in decision-making.
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